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DEALING WITH DYING:
HOW INSURERS CAN HELP PATIENTS
SEEKING LAST-CHANCE THERAPIES
(EVEN WHEN THE ANSWER IS "NO")
Kathy L. Cerminarat
"Making decisions and policies about payment for promising but
unproven last-chance therapies presents the most difficult moral and
clinical policy challenge a health care system can face. "'
Insurers denying coverage for last-chance therapies encounter pa-
tients in dire circumstances who fuel political rhetoric and present
vibrant media images. Typically, a television newscast or a fiery
speech portrays a terminally ill patient (most touchingly a child) who
requires an extremely expensive treatment to live. Opposing that pa-
tient, his or her family, and a community of supporters, is a heartless
insurer, refusing to pay for the treatment. In reality, however, the
question of whether to cover a last-chance therapy would never arise
on facts this clear-cut. The media stories and political rhetoric run
counter to reality. Questions of whether to cover last-chance therapies
arise only in cases in which treatments are of unknown efficacy, at
best, and when health care professionals lack definitive lifesaving
options. Denials of coverage for last-chance therapies because those
therapies are experimental or investigational can never reliably be said
to deny patients treatments that would have saved their lives.
Nevertheless, despite this reality, when insurers deny coverage for
last-chance therapies, patients and their families increase panicky ef-
forts to obtain coverage. Their panic magnifies as they proceed
through external review of coverage decisions. Such review, consist-
ing essentially of opportunities to appeal coverage denials to entities
t Associate Professor, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law
Center. Special thanks for wise counsel are due to Professors Ken Goodman, Bill
Sage and Nic Terry as well as members of the South Florida Bioethics/Health Law
Working Group. For wonderful research assistance, my gratitude goes to Nirjari
Desai and Maxine Scheffler.
1 NORMAN DANIELS & JAMES E. SABIN, SETTING LIMITS FAIRLY 81 (2002)
[hereinafter SETTING LIMITS].
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unrelated to the insurance company denying coverage, was designed
to assure patients that the decision-making process is not self-serving,
tainted by conflict of interest, or lacking scientific foundation. It sel-
dom succeeds in achieving this goal, however, when patients are seek-
ing coverage of last-chance therapies. In those cases, even after an
independent, external review organization examines and affirms an
insurer's determination that a treatment is experimental or investiga-
tional, patients denied coverage continue to feel ill-served by the
health care system. On one hand, this may seem to be inevitable be-
cause patients diagnosed with life-threatening illnesses, grasping at
straws, may never be satisfied unless their insurers pay for every
treatment they seek, no matter how outlandish. On the other hand,
tragic choice theory and recognition of the role that the therapeutic
misconception plays in such settings would indicate that such patients
react as viscerally as they do because, despite the extra layers of pro-
cedure provided by external review, they are left at the end of the day
refusing to accept the reasons for coverage denials and feeling aban-
doned because of the ways in which their insurers have treated them.
This Article will propose a more therapeutic approach2 toward
making decisions and communicating with patients about coverage (or
lack thereof) for last-chance therapies. First, it will explain why those
involved in the dramas that unfold whenever last-chance therapies are
sought seize upon last-chance therapy suggestions as unflinchingly as
they do. Second, it will examine the current system of external review
of coverage denials. Although intended to assure patients of the valid-
ity of denials of coverage in cases in which denials are indeed appro-
priate, as currently configured, external review has not fulfilled its
potential for assisting patients in accepting the decisions of their in-
surers regarding last-chance therapies. Instead, because the proce-
dures in place ignore the special characteristics of last-chance therapy
coverage requests, they fall far short of assuring procedural justice to
patients seeking coverage. Finally, to remedy such shortcomings, this
Article will propose that insurers incorporate interdisciplinary coun-
2 In this sense, because this Article, in part, examines "how law shapes
behavior and affects outcomes" with regard to coverage decision-making, it is one of
a recent series of pieces taking a therapeutic jurisprudential approach toward health
care law. See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REv. 463,466-68
(2002) (describing the development and application of therapeutic jurisprudence).
See also William M. Sage, Managed Care 's Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic
Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J.
597 (2003) (discussing the dilemma and conflicting relationship between medical
necessity, health insurance, and therapeutic benefit). About therapeutic jurisprudence




seling and mediation techniques into the procedures they follow when
determining whether to cover last-chance therapies. Using a well-
rounded, multi-disciplinary, interactive process for coverage decision-
making would better assist patients seeking last-chance therapies.
Indeed, such procedures would help those patients deal with dying in
a more therapeutic way, even when the answer to their pleas for cov-
erage of particular treatments must be "no."
I. PARTICIPANTS IN LAST-CHANCE THERAPY
DRAMAS HAVE UNIQUE SETS OF GOALS AND NEEDS
Patients and their families, the health care providers serving them,
and society in general have unique sets of goals and needs that must
be addressed in last-chance therapy coverage decision-making. Un-
derstanding those goals and needs is crucial to understanding why
external review processes, as currently configured, will not help pa-
tients believe the system is legitimate. Such an understanding will
also pave the way to reforming the process that insurers should follow
when facing these types of decisions.
A. Patients Seeking Coverage of Last-Chance Therapies and Their
Families Are in Vulnerable Positions
"Last-chance therapies" are "unproven treatments [that patients
with life-threatening illnesses] believe may make the difference be-
tween life and death." 3 In such a case, "a person [is] faced with death
in the near future unless she or he has access to a very expensive
medical intervention that offers only a relatively small chance of a
relatively small gain in life expectancy. ' 4 Many times, although not
always, the medical intervention under consideration is the subject of
ongoing research, so medical researchers, who may or may not also be
treating physicians, see patients who are "desperately ill, [for whom]
conventional treatment has failed, [and] no alternative therapies exist.
[.. T]he reason the patient is at the research institution, or wishes to
come to it, is to receive the only therapy left that anyone thinks might
3 SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 67. Use of the term "unproven" is not
limited to describing last-chance therapies. Complementary and alternative medicines
also are sometimes called "unproven," a phenomenon which can seem unnecessarily
prejudicial since much everyday clinical medicine is also "unproven" in the sense of
being unsupported by controlled, double-blind clinical research. See E. Haavi Mor-
reim, A Dose of Our Own Medicine: Alternative Medicine, Conventional Medicine,
and the Standards of Science, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHics 222, 223-26 (2003).
4 Leonard M. Fleck, Last Chance Therapies: Can a Just and Caring Society
Do Health Care Rationing When Life Itself Is At Stake?, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L.
& ETHics 255, 255 (2002).
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be of benefit.",5 Thus, last-chance therapies are those that are un-
proven in the sense of being backed by definitive medical, scientific
evidence showing efficacy, when recommended or considered for
administration to a patient who has a short time to live absent treat-
ment.
1. These Patients and Their Families Are Emotionally Distraught
Some patients seeking coverage of last-chance therapies will be in
the final stages of what has been a long struggle with an illness or a
condition. Some others will only recently have learned of their diag-
noses and will be grappling with the news even as they struggle to
obtain coverage. Regardless of the amount of time they have had to
deal with the news that they need to seek last-chance therapies, these
patients and their families are in vulnerable states.
Upon first glance, it may seem as if the two groups of patients are
radically different from each other. Patients who have been recently
diagnosed with end-stage illnesses for whom conventional therapies
are ineffective seem to differ greatly from patients who have lived
with the diagnosis and progression of illness for some time but who
are finally nearing the stage at which only last-chance therapies offer
any hope. For example, those in the first group arguably may be more
fragile because late-stage diagnosis has deprived them of time to reach
a level of acceptance of their situations. If these groups of patients are
indeed radically different from each other, perhaps they require sepa-
rate consideration.
Insurers should not, however, assume that patients who have lived
a while with a diagnosis requiring resort to last-chance therapies are
greatly different from those who have been recently diagnosed. To
some extent, these two groups of patients are merely at different
points along a continuum, rather than in entirely separate categories.6
And, at least to that extent, although individual cases will of course
involve individual deviations, these patients may be considered as
sharing some major characteristics - characteristics which have been
overlooked in the current decision-making process.
Elisabeth Kiibler-Ross's classic work describing the dying process
notes that all news of impending death will be translated in the uncon-
scious mind into news that one will be killed - a far more violent
proposition than simply dying.7 Recently diagnosed patients seeking
5 Angela R. Holder, Funding Innovative Medical Treatment, 57 ALB. L.
REV. 795, 795 (1994).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 8, 9.
7 ELISABETH KUBLER-ROSs, ON DEATH AND DYING 2 (1969) ("In simple
[Vol. 15:285
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coverage of last-chance therapies are in the beginning stages of either
dying or becoming "survivors."8 For patients diagnosed with such
diseases, the choice is not truly between being cured or dying. There
are those who will "survive," living with the experience and the dis-
ease from then on as "survivors" (emotionally, at least), and then there
are those who will die.9 Both they and persons who are finally facing
imminent death after a long illness, however, are feeling assaulted.
Family members, too, are disinclined to listen calmly to the news
that a patient is dying. They are in the position of watching someone
they love go through the traumatic experience of learning that he or
she is likely to face mortality earlier than anticipated. They also may
feel some guilt at an unconscious level. Like a child, wishing a parent
dead because he or she is angry and then feeling guilty if the parent
actually dies (even though from totally unconnected causes), any feel-
ings of anger family members experienced previously may uncon-
sciously transform into guilt at death or a diagnosis of impending
death. 10 Thus, patients feeling attacked are also surrounded by shell-
shocked family members who have their own reasons for attempting
to deny impending death.
terms, in our unconscious mind we can only be killed; it is inconceivable to die of a
natural cause or of old age.").
8 See Gina Kolata, New Approach About Cancer and Survival, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2004, at Al [hereinafter Kolata, New Approach] (discussing how the experi-
ence of being a survivor of a disease such as cancer is a unique state in itself).
KUbler-Ross similarly considered as "dying" all the patients she interviewed as part of
her work in the late 1960s; she and her colleagues interviewed those patients at vari-
ous points "at any time between the making of a diagnosis until just before death."
KOBLER-Ross, supra note 7, at 23. In some cases the patients even had remissions
without relapses. Id.
9 Kolata, New Approach, supra note 8, at Al (drawing from statements
made by cancer survivors to portray a common mentality toward the disease). The
term cancer survivor "entered the lexicon" about twenty years ago, "in a wrenching
essay in the New England Journal of Medicine." Gina Kolata, In One Word, an Entire
Debate on Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2004, at A14 [hereinafter Kolata, In One
Word]. See also Fitzhugh Mullan, Seasons of Survival: Reflections of a Physician
With Cancer, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 270, 271 (1985) ("Survival, in fact, begins at the
point of diagnosis, because that is the time when patients are forced to confront their
own mortality.").
Cancer researchers believe that the term "survivor" is useful for describing
this phenomenon, although Kolata cautions that the term can be "'a totally incendiary
word within the community."' Kolata, In One Word, supra, at A14 (quoting Ellen
Stovall, president and chief executive of National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship).
"Some who object to being called survivor want to say they are cured; others that they
are living with cancer. Some want to put cancer behind them, and feel that being
called a survivor is like getting an invisible brand." Id.
10 "[I]n our unconscious mind we cannot distinguish between a wish and a
deed." KOBLER-ROSS, supra note 7, at 2-3.
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The first stage of dying in the Kubler-Ross chronicle is character-
ized by denial and isolation. A diagnosis of terminal illness, or im-
pending death from any cause, is devastating and traumatic to hear.
Even physicians, with scientific training and an ability to clinically
detach, experience panic upon learning of life-threatening diagnoses
relating to themselves." During this initial, panicky stage of denial,
when it is natural to feel and to become isolated, Kubler-Ross says:
[w]hat all of our patients stressed was the sense of empathy
which counted more than the immediate tragedy of the news.
It was the reassurance that everything possible will be done,
that they will not be "dropped," that there were treatments
available, that there was a glimpse of hope - even in the most
advanced cases. If the news can be conveyed in such a man-
ner, the patient will continue to have confidence in the doctor,
and he will have time to work through the different reactions
which will enable him to cope with this new and stressful life
situation.
12
And therein lies the rub: a physician might fall into the trap of of-
fering even less-than-hopeful treatment options because he or she is
seeking to respond to this patient need in order to reassure the patient
facing a terminal diagnosis.' 3 Perhaps even believing him or herself
that a current research project offers the best "treatment" for this pa-
l1 See, e.g., Kolata, New Approach, supra note 8, at A 14 (describing one
physician's experience of fear once he learned he had B-cell lymphoma); Mullan,
supra note 9, at 271 (explaining that because of the severity and acknowledgment that
an individual has cancer, fear and anxiety are commonly the initial emotions after
diagnosis).12 KIJBLER-Ross, supra note 7, at 33.
13 Kilbler-Ross advises:
[i]f a doctor can speak freely with his patients about the diagnosis of malig-
nancy without equating it necessarily with impending death, he will do the
patient a great service. He should at the same time leave the door open for
hope, namely, new drugs, treatments, chances of new techniques and new
research. The main thing is that he communicates to the patient that all is
not lost; that he is not giving him up because of a certain diagnosis; that it is
a battle they are going to fight together - patient, family, and doctor - no
matter the end result. Such a patient will not fear isolation, deceit, rejec-
tion, but will continue to have confidence in the honesty of his physician
and know that if there is anything that can be done, they will do it together.
Such an approach is equally reassuring to the family who often feel terribly
impotent in such moments. They greatly depend on verbal or nonverbal re-
assurance from the doctor. They are encouraged to know that everything
possible will be done, if not to prolong life at least to diminish suffering.
KOBLER-ROSS, supra note 7, at 26.
[Vol. 15:285
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tient,14 that physician might mention a research protocol or other ex-
perimental "treatment" as a possibility in order to offer hope and a
source of support. Though patients generally like and value choice, as
recognized throughout bioethics, experiencing panic and isolation in
this situation, they may not want choice or may not know what to do
with it because of emotion and lack of expertise. 15 Fixating upon the
doctor's "recommendation," which the doctor may only have offered
in an effort to ensure that the patient did not feel abandoned or hope-
less, means that the patient will see an insurer's denial of coverage, if
coverage is indeed denied, as unfair and will be bitter.
For a patient with a terminal diagnosis, after denial and isolation
comes anger, although anger is not neatly trammeled into one portion
of the dying process. 16 In times of denial and anger, it is natural to
find a source of blame (besides oneself) for the illness. It would be
natural to find someone to blame for the inability to cure the illness.
One natural target for blame in cases of incurable illness is an insurer
refusing to pay for a treatment, even if that treatment is, at best, an
extremely long shot. If the doctor is "recommending" the "treat-
ment," then the natural source of blame for not receiving the treatment
is the insurer. If the insurance company denies coverage, it becomes
the bad-guy corporate entity trying to second-guess an expert.
Once through denial and isolation, and then anger, in Kubler-
Ross's taxonomy, a patient will proceed through bargaining, depres-
sion, and finally acceptance. Patients in these phases may still be less
knowledgeable about science and medicine than they ideally would
like, but they pass out of the initial, panicky phase. Bargaining,' 7 de-
pression 18 and acceptance 19 will follow, assuming that the patient
works through the complete cycle.20  Yet, throughout, Ktibler-Ross
14 See infra text accompanying note 30.
15 SHERWIN B. NuLAND, How WE DIE: REFLECTIONS ON LIFE'S FINAL
CHAPTER 229 (1994).
16 See KUBLER-ROSS, supra note 7, at 4 ("The process of grief always in-
cludes some qualities of anger.").
17 "If we have been unable to face the sad facts in the first period and have
been angry at people and God in the second phase, maybe we can succeed in entering
into some sort of an agreement which postpones the inevitable happening .. " Id. at
72.
18 There may be two types of depression: "reactive depression," or a despair
that comes about because of current circumstances, and "preparatory depression,"
which "does not occur as a result of a past loss but is taking into account impending
losses." Id. at 75-76.
19 Id. at 78 (describing a state reached only when the patient is able to work
through his anguish and anxieties).
20 According to Sherwin B. Nuland, "every experienced clinician knows that
some patients never, at least overtly, progress beyond denial; many others retain large
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noted: "[i]n listening to our terminally ill patients we were always
impressed that even the most accepting, the most realistic patients left
the possibility open for some cure, for the discovery of a new drug or
the 'last-minute success in a research project.' 21 Patients are likely to
fixate on any mention of such options, even if they have passed
through the initial, panicky stage of first hearing a terminal diagnosis.
Thus, even well after initial diagnosis, even if a patient has pro-
ceeded beyond denial and anger about that diagnosis, it would be easy
for a patient to feel anger when an insurer denies coverage of a last-
chance therapy. The patient will be unhappy with the terms of the
bargain pursuant to which he or she obtained the insurance in the first
place.22 Indeed, considering the agency problems inherent in the ac-
quisition of health insurance in an employer-based system, 23 and the
imbalance of knowledge and the uncertainty of need in the health care
market,24 the patient can hardly be said to knowingly have entered
into that bargain in the first place.
2. Patients and Their Families Do Not Realize That What They Seek
Often Are Not "Therapies"
Moreover, one basic truth emerges when dissecting the view that
still-experimental procedures, practices, and drugs constitute "treat-
elements of it right to the end." NULAND, supra note 15, at 228 (describing the vari-
ous reactions to both the cancer diagnosis and the cycle of emotions some physicians
believe exist). See also Richard Schulz & David Aderman, Clinical Research and the
Stages of Dying, 5 OMEGA 137 (1974) (asserting that data does not support a dying
process with stages, but rather a less rigid process that varies from patient to patient);
Charles A. Corr, Coping With Dying: Lessons That We Should and Should Not Learn
From the Work of Elisabeth Kfibler-Ross, 17 DEATH STuD. 69, 70 (1993) (describing
various criticisms of the Kiibler-Ross stages).
21 KOBLER-Ross, supra note 7, at 123 (quoting a patient interviewer).
22 M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55
STAN. L. REv. 919, 953 (2002) (noting that according "trust value" to ex ante health
care coverage is "at odds with core human needs that we look to medical care to
meet").
23 Kathy L. Cerminara, Contextualizing ADR in Managed Care: A Proposal
Aimed at Easing Tensions and Resolving Conflict, 33 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 547, 567-68,
570 (2002) [hereinafter Cerminara, Contextualizing] (asserting that because many
employees are subject to their employers' agreements, and that they do not receive
copies of the actual insurance contracts, they are unaware of their specific rights and
privileges with their health insurance). See also Kathy L. Cerminara, Taking a Closer
Look At the Managed Care Class Actions: Impact Litigation as an Assist to the Mar-
ket 11 ANNALs HEALTH L. 1, 8 (2002) [hereinafter Cerminara, Closer Look] (observ-
ing that covered individuals are generally at the will of their employers, and do not
have options concerning their coverage).
24 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 941, 945-48 (1963).
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ment" or "therapy" at all. Some may be effective. But some, perhaps
most, last-chance therapies may not constitute therapies at all, and
may even be detrimental to the health of the person undergoing the
"treatment." This Article uses the terms "therapies" and "treatments"
when describing experiments and medical research that may or may
not provide any benefit. But it does so only because of the wide-
spread usage of these terms in this setting and because of the near-
impossibility of eliminating the terms "therapies' and "treatments"
from this discussion. It would be preferable to eliminate the terms
altogether, to reduce the "therapeutic misconception" that arises from
their use. 25
A "therapeutic misconception" exists when a person participating
in a clinical trial, serving as a research subject, believes that he or she
is receiving treatment through the trial.26 In a placebo study, this mis-
conception may even lead a research subject to disregard warnings
that he or she may be randomized into a placebo arm of the study and
thus may not receive treatment at all. Clinical trials websites often
reinforce and even encourage the misconception.27 A person grasping
at straws when faced with the news that conventional treatment will
not provide a cure often mistakenly perceives a last-chance therapy as
therapeutic or potentially therapeutic.28 According to at least one
study, researchers believe that participants in Phase I clinical trials
enroll in those studies "mostly for the possible medical benefit"2 9 The
25 Writing about the challenges inherent in achieving informed consent in
this context, Nancy M. P. King has noted the same reality, stating that "[tihe attempt
to distinguish 'experiment' from 'treatment' and 'researcher' from 'physician' seems
especially doomed precisely when these terms appear most troublesome and in need
of sorting out ... when patients are desperately ill and standard therapies are risky
and of low efficacy; [and] when treating physicians are also engaged in or associated
with clinical research on their patient's conditions." Nancy M. P. King, Experimental
Treatment: Oxymoron or Aspiration?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1995, at 6,
12.
26 See Kathy L. Cerminara, Clinical Trials: Legal Aspects and Consent, in
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL AND FORENSIC MEDICINE (Jason Payne-James et al.
eds., forthcoming July 2005). See infra Part II.B.2.
27 See KENNETH W. GOODMAN, ETHICS AND EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE:
FALLIBILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN CLINICAL SCIENCE 71 (2003).
28 Michelle Oberman & Joel Frader, Dying Children and Medical Research:
Access to Clinical Trials as Benefit and Burden, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 308 (2003)
(citing Paul S. Appelbaum et al., The Therapeutic Misconception: Informed Consent
in Psychiatric Research, 5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 319, 321 (1982)).
29 Oberman & Frader, supra note 28, at 309 (quoting Eric Kodich et al.,
Ethical Issues in Phase 1 Oncology Research: A Comparison of Investigators and
Institutional Review Board Chairpersons, 10 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1810, 1812
(1992)). The AMA Council of Ethical and Judicial Affairs recognizes the potential
for the therapeutic misconception by delineating specifically guidelines intended to
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problem with that belief is that Phase I clinical trials are intended to
study toxicity and the workings of the treatment being studied; they
are decidedly non-therapeutic. The misconception, however, is so
strong and so common that physicians even share in it.
30
Indeed, the very structure of insurance contracts lends credibility
to the misconception. Generally, one must call a last-chance therapy a
"treatment" to even argue for coverage. 3 1 "Treatment" is covered if
"medically necessary" but not if "experimental" or "investigational."
It is hard to say that research is "medically necessary," and it is inac-
curate to say that true treatment is being received in the course of an
experiment. 32 It is more accurate, when a patient has no chance with
conventional treatment but might have a chance of benefit if enrolled
in a research study, to say that some treatment is medically necessary,
but the only treatments available of known efficacy are palliative, and
the patient's only chance for a benefit in the form of cure or remission
may lie in research.
Language compounds the confusion. The misnomers "experi-
mental treatment" and "investigational treatment," used commonly in
insurance contracts, help perpetuate the therapeutic misconception by
using the word "treatment." The term "last-chance therapy," although
commonly used in everyday parlance, goes a step further. It conveys
not only the therapeutic misconception, but also a real sense of ur-
gency, much like the urgency felt when, running late to the airport,
one realizes that one is booked on, and may be about to miss, the "last
flight out." The difference, of course, is that while it is clear that "the
aid physicians who are engaged in clinical investigation primarily for treatment. AM.
MED. Ass'N: COUNCIL OF ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, Opinion 2.07: Clinical
Investigations, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS
23, 23-24 (2002-2003 ed.) [hereinafter CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS].
30 Oberman & Frader, supra note 28, at 309-10.
31 An exception would be in those states mandating coverage of certain clini-
cal trials. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-255 (2003). Further, some plans provide for
such coverage absent a mandate. See Norman Daniels & James E. Sabin, Last
Chance Therapies and Managed Care: Pluralism, Fair Procedures, and Legitimacy,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 27, 40 [hereinafter Last Chance Thera-
pies].
32 This is especially true when a research study is in Phase III of clinical
trials, because then the subject (who thinks of him or herself as a patient) is random-
ized into a group that may not even receive the controversial "treatment." In Phase I
and Phase II, at least, we can be sure that the subject/patient is receiving the alleged
"treatment," but the researchers at these stages are shooting in the dark on toxicity
and efficacy of the substance or procedure being studied. E.g., Sharona Hoffman,
Regulating Clinical Research: Informed Consent, Privacy, and IRBs, 31 CAP. U. L.
REV. 71, 81-83 (2003); Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials.
Responsible Research or Unethical Practice?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 449, 466-69 (2001).
[Vol. 15:285
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last flight out" will transport a passenger to his or her destination, it is
by no means clear that a "last-chance therapy" will help a patient.
Such a therapy, in fact, may even increase the patient's discomfort to
no good end. The therapeutic misconception, assisted by such labels,
nevertheless increases the urgency felt by the patient faced with a
coverage denial, for it results in a likely unfounded belief that an in-.
surer denying coverage is standing in the way of the patient's obtain-
ing a beneficial drug or procedure.
B. Health Care Providers Feel a Need to Offer Something
Faced with such patients, physicians offer last-chance therapies
for a number of reasons. Naturally, and as a matter of training, physi-
cians want to give their patients hope. They, or at least some mem-
bers of the treating team, likely also feel the pressure of the techno-
logical imperative, pushing them to attempt all possible avenues of
potential cure. They may even believe that the law compels them to
mention all possible treatments, even those with infinitesimal chances
of success. Thus, physicians with patients for whom last-chance
therapies may offer the last possibility of cure are likely to believe
they must discuss those therapies with their patients. The result leaves
insurers trying to explain to those patients why the therapies proposed
actually do not offer hope in a realistic sense.
Traditional medical training often advises physicians to always
provide some ray of hope for patients.33 The most obvious way to do
that is to offer hope for a cure, because even a small chance of cure
provides some hope. Kiibler-Ross's studies of the terminally ill, for
example, indicated that they "showed the greatest confidence in the
doctors who allowed for such hope - realistic or not - and appreciated
it when hope was offered in spite of bad news." 34 Sensing this (and
perhaps as a matter of training), physicians are inclined to offer
"treatments" even if the chance offered by the treatments is slim at
best. Unfortunately, physicians try so hard to provide hope in this
sense that they sometimes grasp at straws to do so. 35 Physicians feel
33 NULAND, supra note 15, at 222 ("A young doctor learns no more important
lesson than the admonition that he must never allow his patients to lose hope, even
when they are obviously dying."). See also KOBLER-Ross, supra note 7, at 123 (dis-
cussing the importance of always giving the patient hope).
34 KO3BLER-ROSS, supra note 7, at 123. Kiibler-Ross continues: "This does
not mean that doctors have to tell them a lie; it merely means that we share with them
the hope that something unforeseen may happen, that they may have a remission, that
they will live longer than is expected." Id. Yet many doctors may take that too far.
See infra Part III.A.2.
35 Some physicians see the need to offer hope as requiring hope of a cure or a
treatment. It would be far better if, rather than feeling a need to offer hope in the
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the need to give hope, to assure their patients that they will not be
abandoned, and they may not realize that they are being too hopeful if
they also begin to believe the therapeutic misconception themselves,
as part of the hope-giving process. Their very adoption of a hopeful
tone, ironically, may even encourage the patient to read more hope
into their words than they intend to convey.
There exists in American medicine a technological imperative
counseling that all potential treatments must be attempted. It is all too
common - indeed perhaps all too human - to believe, with respect to
medical procedures, that "if we can, we should. ' ' 36 Indeed, it is this
very technological imperative that has fueled scientific progress in the
form of medical research, arguably at the expense of assuring access
to basic health services in this country. 37 The technological impera-
tive would counsel that a patient should undergo an as-yet unproven
therapy because it might work (and if does, we can, so we should).
The imperative is also apparent in the tendency some physicians have
to refuse to give up in situations in which a patient is nearing the end
of life but can only be kept alive through artificial means such as res-
pirators and feeding tubes. In that setting, patients have fought for,
and won, the right to refuse the administration of the life-prolonging
treatment that some physicians desire to provide. 38 In the last-chance
therapy setting, in contrast, physicians are offering technological ad-
vances to patients who are more than willing to undergo them.
Even if some physicians understand the need to resist the techno-
logical imperative in some cases, a patient may be able to find others
who do not, sometimes without even switching doctors. A patient
facing the need for last-chance therapies is usually in a state so ad-
vanced that a team of physicians, rather than a single physician, will
monitor and administer care. Some physicians on the team may be-
lieve in always offering hope of a cure, in honoring the technological
imperative, in fighting until the last breath. Thus, physicians (not to
mention other members of the care-giving team, such as nurses) may
form of cure or treatment, those physicians worked also on offering hope of a good
death. See NULAND, supra note 15, at 223-24; see also discussion infra Part III.A.2.
(encouraging insurers also to do just that).
36 Cf. Margaret R. McLean, Seeing Double: The Ethics of Human Cloning,
53 HASTINGS L.J. 1049, 1050 (2002) (arguing, in the cloning context, that this techno-
logical imperative "is much too simple a motto for lives as complex as ours").
37 See generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN, BEGINNINGS COUNT: THE
TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (1997) (proposing that
American's borderline obsession with medical technology creates both beneficial and
detrimental effects on American health care culture).
38 See generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE:
THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISION-MAKING (3d ed. 2004).
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find among themselves differences of opinion leading to mixed mes-
sages, the most positive of which is likely to resonate most deeply
with the patient.
Finally, physicians may feel that they must offer access to last-
chance therapies because of informed consent law. Informed consent
law requires disclosure of reasonable alternative therapies, and at
some point, once they are proven enough to offer some real hope,
some experimental or investigational treatments may fall into this
category. 39 There is obscurity in the term "reasonable," however, and
alternative therapies that are "reasonable" are the only ones that doc-
tors must offer.4° Physicians need not offer all therapies, and indeed
they could not do so, for it is nearly impossible to be aware of, let
alone knowledgeable about, the thousands of research protocols under
way at any given time.
C. The Health Care System Cannot Pay for Everything
Although its interests are not foremost in patients' minds, the
health care system as a whole cannot be forgotten in examining the
forces at work in decision-making about last-chance therapy coverage.
Patients, their families, and their physicians are not the only ones with
special stakes in a last-chance therapy coverage decision. Unless and
until coverage of the costs associated with undergoing experimental or
investigational procedures or drugs is provided through a system of
social welfare, or mandated by statute,4 ' insurers' determinations of
whether to cover such procedures and drugs constitute the method by
which society allocates resources among these and various other
39 See Holder, supra note 5, at 806.
40 See NULAND, supra note 15, at 247 (explaining how a term like "reason-
able" is ambiguous and exposes differences between the expectations of doctors and
patients). Compare Martin v. Richards, 531.N.W.2d 70, 78 (Wis. 1995) (requiring
disclosure of alternatives generally accepted in the medical community), with Morris
v. Ferriss, 669 So. 2d 1316, 1327 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (stating if alternative is not a
reasonable option, an "accepted medical treatment for the condition," it need not be
disclosed). Compare Opinion 10.01: Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician
Relationship, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETHics, supra note 29, at 281 ("The patient has the
right to receive information from physicians and to discuss the benefits, risks, and
costs of appropriate treatment alternatives."), with Opinion 8.20: Invalid Medical
Treatment, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETHics, supra note 29, at 238 (stating that physicians
and patients should decide "[a]mong the various treatments that are scientifically
valid, medically indicated, legal, and offer a reasonable chance of benefit for pa-
tients").
41 See Leslie Pickering Francis, Legitimate Expectations, Unreasonable
Beliefs, and Legally Mandated Coverage of Experimental Therapy, 1 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 213 (2004) (describing problems with both statutory coverage mandates and
court decisions requiring coverage).
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health care options. Whether last-chance therapies are "therapies" or
not, they present difficult resource-allocation issues. Especially when
one considers that it is not only private insurers but also governmental
payers that are making these determinations, societal considerations
must rank high on the list of concerns of participants in these dramas.
On one hand, society would like to encourage scientific progress,
so there is some argument in favor of covering last-chance therapies
because of the potential for advancing the state of medicine. It is im-
portant that clinical trials enroll sufficient participants to result in sci-
entifically valid findings so that medical progress will continue. Sci-
entific progress is valuable, and it is no doubt true that progress can-
not occur without experimentation. The question is who should pay
for that progress. There is, after all, not enough money to pay for all
ongoing research, all available proven treatments, and all basic and
preventative health care.
Denial of coverage for last-chance therapies because they are ex-
perimental or investigational thus is perhaps the most striking exam-
ple of decision makers attempting to camouflage "tragic choices" in
medical care.42 "Tragic choices," as described in the classic work of
Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, exist when "[a]ction in the con-
text of necessary scarcity brings ultimate values, the values by which
a society defines itself, into conflict.'A3  Orentlicher describes the
"tragic choices" model of Calabresi and Bobbitt as one "in which so-
ciety chooses to disguise its justifications for making difficult life-
and-death decisions, in order to avoid a paralyzing social conflict over
disparate values." 4 Organ allocation is a classic example. With em-
phasis on "tissue matching between donors and recipients," the organ
allocation system that has been put into practice in this country
can encourage the public to think incorrectly that a scientific,
value-neutral method of selection is being used, when in real-
ity a choice has been made to favor patients who will gain the
most years of benefit from a transplant over patients who have
been waiting longest for a transplant or patients who do not
tolerate kidney dialysis very well.4 5
Economic resources are no different. Clark Havighurst discusses
"[t]he public's occasional psychological need to suppress its aware-
42 GuiDo CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 17 (1978).
41 Id. at 18.
44 DAVID ORENTLICHER, MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH: MAKING MORAL
THEORY WORK IN MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 5 (2001).45 Id. (citations omitted).
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ness of the scarcity of resources" in health care as being "illustrated
most poignantly by its ability to tolerate tragedies that are revealed
only through statistics while at the same time mobilizing virtually
unlimited resources to save a single human life.A
6
The lack of empirical evidence supporting the expenditure of
funds on last-chance therapies is a major motivating factor in most
insurers' decisions to deny coverage. There is nothing wrong with
that; it is morally defensible to attempt to balance both concerns about
the care of an individual patient and concerns about how to conserve
resources so as to best provide for a population of patients.49 Recent
history proves that major expenditures of money on experimental or
investigational treatments have indeed caused great wastes of re-
sources that could have been used to help many people. The famous,
or infamous, example of high-dose chemotherapy with autologous
bone marrow transplant (HDC-ABMT, sometimes called simply
ABMT 50) still rankles both insurers and patient advocates, serving as a
reminder of how easily scarce health care resources can be wasted if
used on unproven therapies.
46 Clark C. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law, in THE
PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 1,
10 (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2003). Calabresi and Bobbitt themselves illustrate "the
differences in the value we place on life in different situations" by noting that "the
United States will spend a million dollars to rescue a single, downed balloonist but
will not appropriate a similar sum to provide shore patrols." CALABRESI & BOBBITT,
supra note 42, at 21.
In the insurance coverage context, the appropriate analogy might be to
compare how individual decision makers feel about coverage with respect to a single,
identified person with how an insurance company feels about coverage with respect to
a number of covered lives. When individual lives rather than covered lives are at
stake, the choices become far more tragic and difficult - thus likely contributing to
the courts' tendency to provide coverage in tragic cases. See Gerard F. Anderson &
Mark A. Hall, The Management of Conflict Over Health Insurance Coverage, in THE
PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 46, at 82, 86 (citing an example where the court ordered insurance cover-
age for an unproven treatment for AIDS). See also William M. Sage, Unfinished
Business: How Litigation Relates to Health Care Regulation, 28 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 387, 401 (2003) (explaining the prevalence of "doctor-centered" views in
litigation, as opposed to regulation, by noting that "[t]he courtroom is the last bastion
of the 'identified life').
49 See Norman Daniels & James Sabin, Limits to Health Care: Fair Proce-
dures, Democratic Deliberation, and the Legitimacy Problem for Insurers, 26 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 303, 317-18 (1997) [hereinafter Limits to Health Care]. Such concerns
thus stand in contrast to concerns about conserving expenditures related to desires to
keep shareholders happy or to maintain high CEO salaries. Id. at 305. The latter
concerns are not morally defensible, for they are not "accepted as relevant by people
who are disposed to finding mutually justifiable terms of cooperation." Id. at 329.
50 For examples of usage of the abbreviation "ABMT" alone, see Sage, supra
note 2; Anderson & Hall, supra note 46.
2005]
HEALTH M TRIX
1. The Case Study of HDC-ABMT
In the late 1990s, women with breast cancer for whom conven-
tional treatment offered no hope became aware of HDC-ABMT as a
treatment option when oncologists began recommending its use on the
basis of the results of some Phase I and Phase II clinical trials. Those
trials indicated that the treatment might improve survival rates and
shrink tumors, but they were not large-scale, randomized, Phase III
clinical trials, which result in the most scientifically valid informa-
tion.5' Once oncologists began recommending HDC-ABMT, how-
ever, the treatment became "relatively common," with its use "diffus-
ing rapidly," even though clinical research had not yet established that
it was superior to conventional treatment.
52
Despite its lack of proven effect, those who heard about HDC-
ABMT desperately wanted to try it when they heard that some physi-
cians believed it was effective. Patients seeking coverage of HDC-
ABMT began using both litigation and the legislative process to pres-
sure their insurers to cover the treatments. Once some insurers were
hit with substantial verdicts for refusals to cover HDC-ABMT 53 (even
though the really large verdicts were awarded in cases involving evi-
dence of hypocrisy and especially blameworthy decisionmaking 4),
and once state legislatures began mandating coverage of the treat-
ment, 55 insurers simply began paying for the treatments, despite their
beliefs that coverage was unwarranted because HDC-ABMT was still
experimental.5 6
51 Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Controversy Over High-
Dose Chemotherapy With Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant for Breast Cancer: A
Cautionary Tale About Allowing Politics and Legal Pressures to Overwhelm Science
in Evaluating New Therapies, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 101, 103-05. See
also Francis, supra note 41, at 227 (asserting that randomized trials are the most
indicative of actual efficacy).
52 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE: COVERAGE OF
AUTOLOGOUs BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION FOR BREAST CANCER, GAO-HEHS-
96-83 5 (1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/he96083.pdf.
53 For a general discussion of these verdicts, see Francis, supra note 41, at
243-50.
54 E.g., Fox v. HealthNet, 29 TRIALS DIGEST 54 (1993), 1993 WL 794305
(describing Case No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1993) in which HealthNet approved
coverage of HDC-ABMT for a relative of its chief executive officer but denied it to
similarly situated woman); Erik Eckholm, $89 Million Awarded Family Who Sued
H.MO., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1993, at Al (discussing damage award against in that
case).
55 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 52, at 11. Francis, supra
note 41, at 233-42 (discussing state statutes mandating insurance coverage of medical
treatments).
56 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 52, at 2; William P. Peters &
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Increased access to HDC-ABMT did not, however, mean that the
United States became a healthier place for women with breast cancer
in the 1990s. In all, more than 41,000 patients, at a cost of about
$80,000 each, underwent HDC-ABMT for breast cancer in the
1990s. 57 By the year 2000, it became clear from randomized Phase III
clinical trials that patients treated with HDC-ABMT actually survived
no longer than did patients treated with conventional treatment.58
Even worse, the highly toxic treatment not only made patients desper-
ately ill but also killed patients itself, whereas standard-dose treatment
did not.59
HDC-ABMT is far from a unique example. More recent techno-
logical advances that could constitute last-chance therapies include
Herceptin therapy for certain breast cancer patients, and the totally
implantable artificial heart for persons with end-stage congestive heart
failure. 60  HDC-ABMT is notable, however, because it was highly
publicized; solid evidence of costs exists; and many studies of it have
been conducted. It serves as an example of the dangers of assuming
scientific efficacy before all experimental phases have been con-
cluded, and it illustrates why insurers are reluctant to fund therapies
early in the experimental process.
Despite the cautionary tale of HDC-ABMT, it undoubtedly re-
mains true that many patients faced with the diagnosis of late-stage
breast cancer hearing of another promising treatment (such as Her-
ceptin therapy) will want to try that treatment even before clinical
research definitively proves its worth. Even in the face of the experi-
mental nature of the treatment and warnings about its possible ghastly
effects, some patients operating under a therapeutic misconception
Mark C. Rogers, Variation in Approval by Insurance Companies of Coverage for
Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED.
473 (1994).
57 Mello & Brennan, supra note 51, at 110. The stated cost is an average
figure, but other estimates of the cost of a course of ABMT treatment have ranged as
high as $200,000. See e.g., Sharona Hoffman, A Proposal for Federal Legislation to
Address Health Insurance Coverage for Experimental and Investigational Treat-
ments, 78 OR. L. REv. 201, 212 (1999).
58 Edward A. Stadtmauer et al., Conventional-Dose Chemotherapy Com-
pared with High-Dose Chemotherapy Plus Autologous Hematopoietic Stem-Cell
Transplantation for Metastatic Breast Cancer, 342 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1069, 1069
(2000). For a discussion of the results of other studies, see Mello & Brennan, supra
note 51, at 105.
59 Mello & Brennan, supra note 51, at 111 ("The recent randomized clinical
trials reported treatment-related mortality rates ranging from zero to 7 percent among
HDC-ABMT recipients, while the standard-dose control arms of the studies had no
such deaths.").
60 Fleck, supra note 4, at 257.
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will still request it. Moreover, not only will they desire the treatment,
but they will want their insurers to fund the cost of it regardless of the
language in their coverage documents.6' Indeed, if the research on
HDC-ABMT had later revealed that the treatment was indeed effec-
tive, the families of those who had died after being denied coverage
because it was experimental would have been furious with their insur-
ers, because the insurers' refusal to cover the treatments had deprived
lost family members of a chance to live.
2. Similarities to Futility Determinations
To bioethicists, "last-chance therapy" situations and notions of fu-
tility might even seem to overlap or be the same. In some senses last-
chance therapy coverage denials resemble situations in which physi-
cians refuse to provide treatment they deem futile.62 In instances of
futility, physicians use their technical expertise to say a treatment no
longer provides medical benefit to the patient. Daniels and Sabin say
that the difference between "last-chance therapy" situations and futil-
ity situations is that last-chance therapies "are marked by uncertainty"
- they are promising but unproven. 63 In contrast to the uncertainty
existing regarding the value of last-chance therapies, they say that
futile treatments are proven; physicians know what benefit they could
provide, but they provide no medical benefit in the case at hand.
6 1 Anderson & Hall, supra note 46, at 86 (noting that in Bradley v. Empire
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 562 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct. 1990), "the court ordered an
insurer to cover ABMT treatment for an AIDS patient despite evidence that his physi-
cian was the only one in the country who had ever used the treatment in this fashion
and despite the patient's having signed an informed consent form that emphasized the
experimental nature of the treatment."). See also Francis, supra note 41, at 215 (dis-
cussing patients' efforts to obtain coverage for expensive therapies despite their in-
surers' denials of coverage).
62 See ORENTLICHER, supra note 44, at 158. See also id. at 127-28 (noting
that "[c]ases of medical futility involve a reversal of the traditional life-sustaining
treatment disagreement between patient and physician ... situations in which patients
have not expressed a readiness to die, but physicians wish to withhold ventilators,
dialysis, feeding tubes, or other life-sustaining treatment anyway"). Orentlicher notes
that futility cases are
ostensibly independent of cost considerations. The explicit claim is not that
the treatment provides some potentially meaningful benefit but the costs are
too high to justify the small benefit produced. Rather the claim is that the
treatment will not provide any meaningful medical benefit. Even if the
treatment were inexpensive, it still would not be appropriate to offer the
treatment to the patient.
Id. at 129 (emphasis in original).
63 SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 83 n. 1.
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Such an easy distinction between futility and last-chance thera-
pies, however, may not be appropriate. Arguably it is, if we are dis-
cussing only situations of scientific, or quantitative, futility. 64 If, how-
ever, we focus on physician assertion of qualitative 65 futility, then the
distinction between futile treatments and last-chance therapies be-
comes less clear. Sometimes physicians or health care institutions
assert futility as a reason to refrain from treating, not when treatment
is of no benefit, but when treatment would consume so many re-
sources that it would unfairly impact on others' ability to receive
health care.66
In the latter situation, like denials of coverage because of the in-
vestigational or experimental status of the proposed treatment, some
people argue that physicians' assertions that treatment will be futile
often constitute rationalizations for rationing medical care.67  Or-
entlicher agrees "with the critics of futility that few treatments truly
are futile in the sense that futility doctrine suggests. In general, there
is some benefit that could be gained from treatment, even if the bene-
fit may be of marginal value, and the costs of treatment may be very
high. 68 He argues that "it seemingly is wrong in terms of moral the-
64 See Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning and
Ethical Implications, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 949, 949 (1990) (defining quanti-
tative futility as existing when treatments do not have a realistic chance of working).
65 Qualitative futility exists when the medical benefit that would result from
treatment is so small or lacking in meaning that it should not be considered a benefit.
Id.
66 See Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-beneficial" Medical
Treatment, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 512, 514 (1991) (commenting on the Helga Wan-
glie case). But see Marcia Angell, The Case of Helga Wanglie - A New Kind of
"Right to Die" Case, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 511, 512 (1991) (arguing that this view
of futility is not appropriate if it were to result in forcing refusal of treatment a family
or patient otherwise would have wanted). See also MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note
38, §§ 13.03[B] & [C] (differentiating between a broad view and a narrow, physio-
logical view of futility); Lois Shepherd, Sophie's Choices: Medical and Legal Re-
sponses to Suffering, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 103, 130-31 (1996) ("Futility, as ap-
plied, means that the doctors do not think the treatment will enable you to have a
good enough life. If the medical profession cannot give you a better life, then perhaps
you should have no life at all.").
67 ORENTLICHER, supra note 44, at 129 (describing some commentators'
arguments).
68 Id. at 130 (emphasis in original). He goes on to suggest that determining
whether a treatment is futile is not merely a matter of science:
By calling a treatment medically futile, a physician is suggesting that we
have a situation in which treatment provides no medical benefit. [But]...
[t]he concept of futility conveys not only the idea of no benefit; it also indi-





ory to withhold life-sustaining treatments by invoking the concept of
futility. Rather, physicians should justify their decision to deny de-
sired care by citing cost considerations., 69 But:
we can understand the desire for a concept of futility in terms
of the need to avoid explicit rationing .... If physicians claim
that a treatment offers no real benefit, then it seems that no
one is wronged by withholding the treatment. If, on the other
hand, physicians were to acknowledge that the treatment of-
fers some benefit, but still denied the treatment so resources
could be preserved for other patients, then the patients denied
treatment would feel that their needs were being unfairly ig-
nored.7 °
Physicians in this situation are experiencing the same sort of deci-
sion-making in which insurers engage regarding last-chance thera-
pies. 7' Just as physicians arguing that a treatment is qualitatively fu-
tile are not saying the treatment is totally without any scientific bene-
fit, so too are insurers not exactly denying that requested last-chance
therapies might offer some benefit. They are saying instead that the
scientific evidence does not yet indicate that the benefit is'certain
enough to pay for the treatment. Yet patients still feel that the sought-
after treatments offer (or could offer) some benefit, just as families or
patients fighting physician futility determinations do. In both situa-
tions, the patients (or families or surrogates in the cases of patients
without decision-making capacity) feel that their needs are being un-
fairly ignored.
In that sense, debates over coverage of last-chance therapies and
those over physician assertions of futility of certain treatments may
have more in common than they initially appear to. The commonal-
ities may appear instructive when considering why external review as
currently configured, although a step toward legitimacy in decision-
making, does not go far enough in facilitating deliberative dialogue
with patients and easing the way toward acceptance of decisions (or at
least of the legitimacy of the process by which they are reached).
69 Id. at 130.
70 Id. at 130-31.
71 See also King, supra note 25, at 12 (describing questions of what consti-
tutes experimental treatment, "surprisingly," as "turn[ing] out to be almost indistin-
guishable from those being raised by the futility debate"). Cf. Robert M. Veatch,
Doctor Does Not Know Best: Why in the New Century Physicians Must Stop Trying to
Benefit Patients, 25 J. MED. & PHIL. 701, 717 (2000) (suggesting that the principle of
justice may be used to determine if patients are eligible for scarce medical resources).
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II. EXTERNAL REVIEW HAS NOT RESPONDED TO
THESE PARTICIPANTS' (PARTICULARLY
PATIENTS') GOALS AND NEEDS
As insurers began extensively to manage care in the 1980s and
1990s, and even as managed care began disintegrating into "con-
sumer-driven health care" in the early 21st century, many patients -
not only those facing questions about access to last-chance therapies -
struggled to understand why insurers were second-guessing the deci-
sions of their physicians. As important, patients struggled to under-
stand the rules governing such second guesses, and to navigate dispute
resolution systems to complain about the results. For a while, policy
analysts and legislators believed that patients would find a solution in
external review of plan decisions on issues such as whether a pro-
posed treatment was medically necessary (so as to permit coverage) or
whether it was experimental or investigational (so as to deny cover-
age).
External review adds an extra layer of procedure to the typical
process of a pre-service coverage denial. Typically, an insurer will
communicate its decision on a claim for coverage by sending a letter -
usually a form letter - and including in that letter any information that
may be required by law. 72 The patient then has a certain amount of
time (usually set forth in the notice of denial) to appeal to a person or
group authorized to handle appeals within the same insuring entity.
73
Timing may be accelerated in urgent cases, 74 but, regardless of timing,
these appeals are almost exclusively paper processes, meaning that the
review is conducted of medical records and other treatment informa-
tion presented on paper. Once a first-level internal appeal has been
decided, the person or group deciding that appeal generally will send
another letter - again, usually a form - to communicate the decision
made.75 This notice likely will contain information about avenues
either for further (second-level) appeal within the insuring entity, or
for external reviews. If a state mandates or an insurer voluntarily of-
fers external review, the patient gets a chance to argue, again usually
72 E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2650.503-1(g) (2004) (stating requirements for determi-
nations by ERISA-governed employee health care coverage plans).
71 E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h) (stating that a claimant can appeal "to an
appropriate named fiduciary of the plan, . . . who shall consult with a health care
professional who has appropriate training and expertise in the field of medicine in-
volved in the medical judgment").
74 E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(3)(vi) (providing for expedited procedures
in urgent cases).




on paper, to an outside entity (but not yet a court) that the coverage
denial was incorrect.
It is likely fair to say that people thought external review would
cure many of the ills plaguing the health care dispute resolution sys-
tem. Although the first state-mandated external review system ap-
peared well before managed care became commonplace in American
medicine, most were required by law only in the late 1990s.7 7 By this
time, patients in America seeking coverage for treatments from insur-
ance companies had built up a head of frustration with insurers, who
appeared to them to be second-guessing their physicians in denying
coverage for treatments physicians recommended. Lack of transpar-
ency and inequities characterized the procedures that those patients
had to follow in seeking reversal or revision of their insurers' deci-
sions. Many hoped that permitting patients to ask independent experts
to review some of their insurers' denials of coverage would help pa-
tients accept those decisions to deny coverage.
Unfortunately, while achieving some of its goals, external review
has not proven to be an unqualified success. In some senses, it has
helped ease patients' suspicions about insurers' motives in making
coverage decisions. In the last-chance therapy setting, however, ex-
ternal review has proven to be of no benefit in terms of helping pa-
tients denied coverage to believe in the legitimacy of the system
A. The Current State of External Review
External review is a formal process to resolve disputes between
health plans and patients by submitting those disputes to expert deci-
sion makers independent from either the health plan or the patient.78
It came about as an attempt to assure patients facing denials of cover-
age that their insurers truly had stewardship obligations and scientific
efficacy, rather than profit-motivated economy and self-interest, in
mind when denying payment for certain treatments.79
76 See infra Part II.A.
77 Michigan passed a law establishing the first state-mandated external re-
view program in 1978. External review mandates became much more popular begin-
ning in the early 1990s, and became widespread beginning in 1998. KAREN POLLITZ
ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, ASSESSING STATE EXTERNAL REVIEW PROGRAMS
AND THE EFFECTS OF PENDING FEDERAL PATIENTS' RIGHTS LEGISLATION 1 (2002),
available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/externalreviewpart2rev.pdf.
78 Id. at v. See also id. at 1.
79 See, e.g., TRUDY LIEBERMAN ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION &
CONSUMERS UNION, A CONSUMER GUIDE TO HANDLING DISPUTES WITH YOUR
EMPLOYER OR PRIVATE HEALTH PLAN, 2003 UPDATE 1 (2003), available at
http://www.kff.org/consumerguide (asserting that external reviews "provide an unbi-
ased way to resolve disputes between patients and their health plans"). Of course,
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For example, in Illinois, in a system of external review made fa-
mous in a recent Supreme Court case, 80 a state statute requires that a
health maintenance organization (HMO) refusing to cover a recom-
mended treatment as not medically necessary submit the dispute to a
reviewing physician "holding the same class of license as the primary
care physician [who recommended the treatment], who is unaffiliated
with the [HMO], jointly selected by the patient..., primary care phy-
sicians and the [HMO]."81 If the independent reviewing physician
considers the treatment to be medically necessary, then the HMO
must cover that treatment. There is nothing in the statute requiring
that the reviewing physician refer to the definition of "medically nec-
essary" appearing in the coverage contract, although reviewing physi-
cians apparently do in fact refer to such contractual definitions in
making their decisions.
Other external review statutes apply to disputes between health
plans and patients over treatment that the health plans refuse to cover
as experimental or investigational. In California, for example, the
Friedman-Knowles Experimental Treatment Act of 1996 built on a
system of voluntary external review used initially by Aetna and then
by Northern California Kaiser Permanente in the early to mid-1990s.
83
Pursuant to that Act, which has since been amended to expand exter-
nal review programs to include medical necessity decisions as well,
84
the legislature mandated that "every health care service plan" provide
"an external, independent review process" to examine all decisions
regarding experimental or investigational therapies if the patients
seeking coverage met certain criteria. Pursuant to this process, a pa-
tient dissatisfied with a denial of coverage because a proposed treat-
ment is deemed experimental or investigational, or his or her physi-
cian, now may, with required certification of certain facts, ask an in-
dependent review organization contracted with the state to review the
medical records and other evidence of the patient's illness and the
assuring patients of the validity of their insurers' motives may also benefit insurers by
decreasing the likelihood that patients will sue, thus pleasing the insurers' risk man-
agement departments as well.
80 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
8t 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10 (West 1993).
82 See Moran, 536 U.S. at 382 n.12. For in-depth analysis of the problems
that would arise if reviewers did not refer to contractual definitions of "medical ne-
cessity," see E. Haavi Morreim, ERISA Takes a Drubbing: Rush Prudential and Its
Implications for Health Care, 38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 933 (2003).
83 See SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 73-76.
84 Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.4 (West 2000 & Supp.
2005); CAL. INS. CODE § 10145.3 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004), with CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1374.30 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005).
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treatment's efficacy. An independent review organization's decision
that coverage is appropriate is binding on the insuring entity,86 and,
accompanied by reasoning, will (with identifying information deleted)
be available to the public upon request.
87
Daniels and Sabin have described California's procedure as one in
which both "[t]he fact and appearance of conflict of interest was re-
moved.", 88 That was in fact the purpose. If patients seeking coverage
proceeded through independent review by experts, the thought was,
those patients would feel more confident about the decision-making
process and be assured that appropriate and equitable decisions were
made.89 If outside experts confirmed a health plan's decision that a
treatment was experimental or investigational, after all, then the deci-
sion could not have stemmed from inappropriate concern about the
health plan's pocketbook. Such procedures provided an extra layer of
procedural justice9" as patients attempted to achieve coverage.
1. Goals of External Review
Patients generally needed such assurance because of the nature of
the American health care system. The private nature of the system
invites concerns (on both the provision of care end and the coverage
end) about money-making motives. The diffuse, complex, and con-
fusing nature of dispute resolution with regard to coverage issues,
moreover, confounds most patients, leaving them unable to truly un-
derstand what is happening throughout the coverage determination
procedure. The procedures by which patients can complain about
insurer decisions are notoriously varied and confusing.91 Addition-
ally, the challenges insurers face in managing care decisions for popu-
85 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1370.4, 1374.30, 1374.32, 1374.33
(West 2000 & Supp. 2005).
86 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.34 (made applicable to cases of
investigational or experimental treatment through § 1370.4).
87 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.33 (made applicable to cases of
investigational or experimental treatment through § 1370.4).
88 SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 74.
89 INST. FOR MED. QUALITY, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., INDEPENDENT
MEDICAL REVIEW EXPERIENCES IN CALIFORNIA, PHASE I: CASES OF
INVESTIGATIONAL/EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS 1 (2002), available at
http://www.imq.org/IMQDOC.CFM/l [hereinafter PHASE I REVIEW].
90 See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
91 See Cerminara, Contextualizing, supra note 23, at 580-82; Eleanor D.
Kinney, Tapping and Resolving Consumer Concerns About Health Care, 26 AM. J.L.
& MED. 335, 380 (2000). See also ELEANOR DEARMAN KINNEY, PROTECTING
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS (2002).
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lations using limited resources when physicians are making decisions
for individual patients lead to inevitable tensions between desires for
treatment and inability or reluctance to pay for the administration of
that treatment. Finally, those tensions arise against a backdrop of
perceived unfairness because some people have adequate remedies
when a denial of coverage results in medical injury, and some do
not.
9 2
External review was supposed to change at least some of that. Al-
though concerns about binding-arbitration-like external review solu-
tions manifested themselves in a number of ways, 93 some legislatures
adopted external review particularly as a method of dealing with deni-
als of coverage for treatment deemed experimental or investiga-
tional.94 External review has been held to be a permissible way for
the states to try to ensure that insurers act appropriately when denying
coverage, in that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) does not prevent states from legislating in this area, as
it does with respect to certain other insurer decisions made in the
name of managing care. 95 Intended to achieve noble procedural jus-
92 For a recent example, see Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S.Ct. 2488
(2004) (holding that a state statute providing for recovery for personal injury when
health plan decision was negligent was preempted by the Employee Retirement Secu-
rity Act of 1974 (ERISA)). Insured persons whose cases are governed by ERISA
cannot gain "make-whole relief." See id. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also
Cicio v. Does, 385 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2004), vacating 321 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003)
(concerning ERISA preemption of claim based on plan medical director's alleged
negligent denial of coverage for experimental procedure).
93 Cerminara, Contextualizing, supra note 23, at 552-53 (providing examples
of the flaws in differing methods of health care arbitration). In addition to procedural
justice concerns, if arbitration-like external review results in an alternative remedy for
an ERISA § 502 claim, then the statute mandating that review would be preempted.
See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 378 (2002). In Moran, the
Supreme Court ruled, somewhat illogically, that the external review system in Illinois,
although binding, constituted a medical second opinion rather than being the equiva-
lent of arbitration. Id. at 383-84. Cf Sage, supra note 2, at 627 (pointing out that the
Illinois law refers in its title to dispute resolution).
94 As noted, California's Knowles-Friedman Act initially was aimed solely at
review of treatments deemed investigational or experimental.
95 Compare Moran, 536 U.S. at 355 (holding that ERISA did not preempt
Illinois external review law pursuant to which a reviewer had required an HMO to
cover an unconventional type of surgery), with Davila, 124 S.Ct at 2502 (holding that
ERISA did preempt Texas statute under which patients who had suffered injury as a
result of their health plans' decisions not to cover recommended treatments could
demand compensation for that personal injury). Even within the external review
context, ERISA preemption continues to result in inequity because state laws regard-
ing external review can apply only to decisions made by insured, and not to self-
insured, ERISA plans, by virtue of ERISA's deemer clause. See 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(2)(B) (2000); Moran, 536 U.S. at 371 n.6.
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tice goals, external review thus has been given a boost through state
legislatures and the United States Supreme Court.
2. Realities of External Review
In reality, however, external review programs have been only
somewhat successful in achieving their procedural justice goals.
While external review of medical necessity decisions seems partially
to have assured patients of the integrity of the decision-making proc-
ess, leading those patients to somewhat enhanced acceptance of cov-
erage denials,96 patients seeking coverage of experimental or investi-
gational treatments continue to express dissatisfaction with, and dis-
trust of, plan decision-making procedures when coverage is denied.97
Procedural justice principles, indicating that patients might more eas-
ily accept even negative decisions as long as they believe they were
treated fairly during the decision-making process, do not seem to ap-
ply to coverage denials when proposed treatments are deemed ex-
perimental or investigational.
Moreover, few patients use the procedures. 98 This might tend to
indicate that many people still do not know about or understand that
review procedures are available to them in cases of coverage denials.
Alternatively, it might tend to indicate that people do not understand
how to access such procedures. The fact that some states do not man-
date that patients be told anything about external review until internal
appeals processes are completed 99 might contribute to patients' lack
of awareness of, or understanding of, such procedures. Thinking posi-
tively, the relatively low rate of usage might mean that providing the
option of external review itself actually has led to increased percep-
tions of legitimacy of the decision-making process - enough so that
patients are not tempted to seek the external review, but instead are
reassured by its very availability. 00
96 See INST. FOR MED. QUALITY, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., INDEPENDENT
MEDICAL REVIEW EXPERIENCES IN CALIFORNIA, PHASE II: CASES INCLUDING MEDICAL
NECESSITY 32 (2003), available at http://www.imq.org/imqdoc.cfm/1 [hereinafter
PHASE II REvIEw].
97 PHASE I REVIEW, supra note 89, at 10-15.
98 POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 77, at v-vii.
99 See id. at 10.
100 Last Chance Therapies, supra note 31, at 33-34 (describing Kaiser experi-
ence and using low usage of procedure there as evidence that
[w]hen the patients' concerns about insurer trustworthiness and potential
conflict of interest were addressed in advance by the option of going outside
of Kaiser for independent consultation, patients and families were much
readier to enter into a reflective dialogue with their Kaiser physicians about
what treatment approach really made sense for them.
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Of note is the fact that external review apparently has not uncov-
ered widespread pockets of insurers denying coverage inappropriately.
Reviews overturn coverage denials only about half the time.1 °1 Ar-
guably, on one hand, this should act as a confidence-builder in cover-
age decision-making processes; even though people are dismayed
with coverage denials, independent experts say that the insurers are
actually doing the right thing about half the time. On the other hand,
the insurers are only doing the right thing about half the time. Being
wrong half the time is not exactly a stellar record. And if one is pre-
disposed to believe that improper motives underlie insurers' decision-
making, then one also might tend to view a system in which external
reviews overturn denials only about half the time as casting doubt on
the independence of those external reviews.' 0 2 Such suspicion surely
is speculative; the requirements of independence are explicit and
clear, and there is no evidence that any of the external review organi-
zations are in fact self-interested.
0 3
B. External Review, as Typically Configured, Ignores Inevitable
Emotions
Clearly then, external review alone is not enough to fulfill the
high hopes policymakers had about enhancing confidence in the
health care decision-making system, at least in the context of deci-
sion-making about last-chance therapies. As indicated by studies
done in California, external review as configured in most statutory
schemes at this time does not help people accept the decisions of their
insurers to deny coverage because a treatment is experimental or in-
vestigational.10 4 It is easy to make patients happy when deciding to
approve coverage, but that is not always the right thing to do. Deci-
sions denying coverage for some treatments are inevitable; no plan
can cover all treatments, and indeed none contract to do that. The
challenge is to make and convey denials in ways that help patients
101 POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 77, at v-vi; PHASE I REVIEW, supra note 89, at
9; PHASE II REVIEW, supra note 96, at 16.
102 See, e.g., Nguyen v. Healthguard of Lancaster, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 296,
300 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (involving denial of coverage based on medical necessity,
where the complaint hinted at "suspicion about the bona fides of the independent
reviewer").
103 There may be some argument that external review organizations might
wish to rule for certain insurers because they would like to do more business with
those insurers in the future. That also is speculation, however, and in some states the
system by which the independent review organization is chosen is set up to preclude
that possibility. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.1387(1) (West 2002).
104 PHASE I REVIEW, supra note 89, at 2; PHASE 1I REVIEW, supra note 96, at
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accept them. As Bill Sage has noted with regard to medical necessity
decision-making, external review systems are better than a simple
denial accompanied by an offer to review the decision within the same
internal corporate structure, but they do not go far enough to assure all
patients that they are being heard and that they are not being aban-
doned at the time that they are being denied coverage. 10 5 Instead, for
a number of reasons, a patient's quest for coverage of last-chance
therapies can practically be guaranteed to result in conflict, thus justi-
fying a conflict management, 10 6 rather than a dispute resolution, ap-
proach on the part of insurer decision makers. This is especially true
when one considers the vulnerable state of patients and families en-
gaged in the struggle to obtain coverage for last-chance therapies.
1. As a Tragic Choice, Decision-Making Regarding Last-Chance
Therapies Will Cause Conflict
As noted, last-chance therapies present stark examples of the
tragic-choice phenomenon. As Daniels and Sabin state:
Important values, all of which command respect and attention,
inevitably come into conflict in these difficult situations, es-
pecially giving some... priority to meeting the urgent claims
of patients in last-chance situations, providing stewardship of
collective resources, producing the public good of scientific
knowledge about the effectiveness of unproven therapies, and
respecting patient autonomy through collaborative decision-
making about risks and benefits.
10 7
Societies often cannot resolve difficult life-and-death decisions ex-
plicitly because doing so would cause too much social discord. 10 8 The
disappointment and anger patients express upon coverage denials rep-
resent that discord on an individual level.
As previously noted, when an insurer has stewardship of a fund of
money to be used to pay for the treatments of all persons within a
covered population, that insurer cannot approve coverage of all treat-
ments. Contract exclusions of coverage for experimental and investi-
105 Sage, supra note 2, at 623.
106 See Cerminara, Contextualizing, supra note 23, at 583-84 (proposing an
alternative "conflict management" approach to resolving health care disputes).
107 SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 81-82.
108 ORENTLICHER, supra note 44, at 123 (describing the writings of Calabresi
& Bobbitt). Orentlicher notes that subterfuges disguising tragic choices often are
successful for a time, but that eventually the public recognizes that they represent
illusions that conflict has been avoided. Id. at 127. That recognition may mean that
the public will demand a change in the method of resource allocation. Id.
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gational treatments are predicated on a cost-benefit analysis,10 9 based
upon a determination that it is better to allocate scarce resources to
pay for proven treatments, which are far more likely to benefit their
recipients, than for treatments that may or may not be of any value
and often are expensive. Enforcing those exclusions, even in the face
of a sympathetic case, is necessary to ensure equitable, predictable," 0
and adequate distribution of resources.
In discussing futility, Orentlicher describes the argument ad-
vanced by some that instead of invoking ethical principles to refuse to
provide ethically futile care, physicians should explicitly admit that
they are rationing care."' Orentlicher rebuts that argument and states
as follows:
The problem with [the argument that physicians should just
explicitly ration care] is that it overlooks the tragic choices
problem. The likelihood of unresolvable social conflict
means that it is often not possible to engage in rationing ex-
plicitly when life-and-death decisions are being made. Ac-
cordingly, societies commonly look for implicit ways to ra-
tion. The use of futility can be seen as an implicit rationing
strategy that makes it possible for doctors to deny life-
sustaining care in appropriate cases." 
2
Similarly, as discussed earlier, when an insurer decides to deny
coverage for a last-chance therapy based upon the "experimental" or
"investigational" treatment exclusions in contract language, it is mak-
ing an inexplicit resource-allocation decision. The problem arises
when people realize that the insurers are in fact engaging in rationing.
Although disguised, the rationing should be of no surprise since eve-
ryone knows that insurers are business people. People may be more
ready to believe that insurers are rationing than they are ready to be-
lieve physicians are, because insurers are supposed to be in business
for the money, whereas tradition has accorded to physicians a warm,
professional, and caring image. Matters are convoluted, however, by
the merging issues of coverage and care in the managed care system,
109 ROBERT P. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 64[c][3] (2d ed.
1996).
110 Predictability matters for purposes of determining risk. This is essential to
an insurer, whose role is to assume risk in exchange for a price calculated to make the
assumption of risk a winning proposition. See HEALTH INS. ASS'N OF AM., THE
BusINEss OF INSURANCE: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION TO INSURANCE 9-12
(1998).




and by insurers' assurances on websites and in plan documents that
their health care professionals will work with patients' health care
professionals to see that patients receive good care.'1 3  Moreover,
even with the most business-like of insurers, it is jarring to come up
against reality in a setting in which one's life is at stake. Revealed
tragic choices always cause discord, and recognition of the not-
exactly-hidden resource allocations involved in insurers' denials of
coverage for last-chance therapies will cause people to rebel. This is
especially so because even physicians can disagree regarding "the
definition of experimental treatment and when a new treatment is no
longer experimental."
' 14
2. Last-Chance Therapy Decision-Making Brings Patients Face to
Face with the "Misconception" Part of the Therapeutic
Misconception
Patients being denied coverage of last-chance therapies, then, are
coming face to face with the fact that rationing is part of the market
forces underlying insurance contracts. At the same time, they are
being robbed of hope. Recall that the therapeutic misconception ex-
ists when a patient does not fully appreciate - or subconsciously re-
fuses to acknowledge - the experimental part of the description of a
last-chance therapy. This may be even more likely to occur when the
patient is a child and the person desiring, consenting to, and seeking
coverage of the last-chance therapy is a parent, desperate because his
or her child faces death. 15 In that setting, Oberman and Frader have
labeled participation in clinical trials in the hope of attaining life-
saving treatment as "a societal death ritual... the way in which our
society presently permits parents to grieve the horror of grave illness
and premature death in children."'"
16
When physicians offer last-chance therapies, patients are being
told that there exists a treatment that is being tested that might do
them some good. That gives the patients hope, however ill-founded.
Insurers then bring those patients back to reality with the news that the
113 See Cerminara, Closer Look, supra note 23, at 21 (quoting such marketing
materials). See also Thomas Morawetz, Insurance: How it Matters as Psychological
Fact and Political Metaphor, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 7 (2000) (noting that "insurance
companies aim to project an image of personalized concern and care"); Deborah A.
Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11,
18-19 (2000) .(describing advertisements portraying insurance as a "helping institu-
tion").
114 ORENTLICHER, supra note 44, at 147.
15 Oberman & Frader, supra note 28, at 315.
116 Id. at 317.
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costs will not be covered because the "treatment" is experimental or
investigational. Perhaps part of the issue is whether an appropriate
amount of information is being provided, in the appropriate way, dur-
ing the discussions between patients and doctors about last-chance
therapies. When doctors fall into the trap of the therapeutic miscon-
ception along with their patients, attempting too hard to give hope of
cure to those patients, they leave insurers to burst the patients' bubbles
of hope with the reality that the value of a last-chance therapy is un-
known and often speculative at best.
Moreover, the explosion of information about ongoing research
that is available on the Internet means that many patients' hopes in
last-chance therapies are not even traceable to their physicians. Many
patients obtain a great deal of information themselves from the Inter-
net. Internet sites about clinical trials are often worded in ways that
promote the therapeutic misconception.1 7 Alternatively, or perhaps
additionally, patients participate in support groups that are heavily
involved in clinical trials. 18 In support groups, patients hear clinical
trials being described as treatment, similar to the message that was
spread when AIDS activists began demanding access to clinical trials
by carrying signs stating, "A Drug Trial is Health Care Too."' 19 Thus,
there are other sources, besides doctors, that lead to and encourage the
therapeutic misconception. Insurers need to be aware of, and take
account of, the misconception when dealing with patients seeking
coverage for last-chance therapies.
III. A MORE THERAPEUTIC APPROACH WILL
BETTER ASSIST IN HANDLING THESE CONFLICTS
It may seem as if last-chance therapy coverage decision-making
presents a no-win situation for insurers. Coverage approvals leave
patients satisfied, but then are not always appropriate. Coverage deni-
als will always be issued into an atmosphere of uncertainty and odds-
playing, and they will always leave someone disappointed. Patients
are likely almost always to be dissatisfied with the ex post coverage
effects of their insurance contracts that they did not foresee ex ante.
117 See GOODMAN, supra note 27, at 71.
118 See, e.g., CLINICAL TRIALS HELP, at http://www.clinicaltrialshelp.org (last
visited Apr. 8, 2005). See also COALITION OF NAT'L CANCER Coop. GROUPS INC.,
Knowledge is Power: Educate Yourself Now on Cancer Clinical Trials, NEWSWEEK:
SPECIAL ADVERTISING SEC., 2004, at 1, 2 (The advertising supplement says, "When
you participate in a trial, in addition to receiving quality treatment, you are playing an
important role in the acquisition of medical knowledge.") (on file with author).
119 George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation:
Nuremberg, Helsinki, andBeyond, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 132 (1992).
2005]
HEAL TH MATRIX
If insurers were, however, to take better account of the situations
in which patients and their families find themselves when seeking
coverage of last-chance therapies, then the process can be less antago-
nistic. Rather than taking place in a combative setting, it can take
place in an atmosphere inviting deliberation and reason-giving, and
can permit patients and their families to feel some of the positive ef-
fects of procedural justice that external review procedures were sup-
posed to produce.
This Article is not about how to define "experimental" or "inves-
tigational" in insurance contracts or statutes so that patients seeking
coverage of last-chance therapies will be satisfied. Many definitions
have been proposed and discussed in the literature. 20  Rather, this
Article focuses on the procedures to follow in communicating with
patients about the decision-making process and about decisions, so as
to properly apply whatever contract definitions are in effect and con-
currently to help patients respect the process and the eventual deci-
sion, even if the decision is to deny coverage. Going a step or two
beyond external review, it expands upon ideas found in sources as
diverse as political philosophy and alternative dispute resolution lit-
erature. Expressly multidisciplinary in approach, the procedures rec-
ommended will help insurers build confidence in the legitimacy of
their decision-making in even this trickiest of areas. Reaching, in
some places, to bioethics for inspiration, this Article recognizes the
value of making the last-chance therapy coverage decision-making
process more "therapeutic," as recommended by Bill Sage with regard
to medical necessity decision-making.
In an article focusing primarily on medical necessity determina-
tions, Sage proposes an alternative approach to decision-making in
managed care, arguing that "health plans should make a serious at-
tempt to identify traditional ethical values associated with healing and
build them into coverage determinations.' 21 Sage recommends that,
in denying coverage, health plans should emulate doctors conveying a
120 See Anderson & Hall, supra note 46, at 86 (noting definitions proposed by
Brook and Hadom, Kalb, Eddy, Havighurst, themselves, Ellman & Hall, and
Rosenbaum & Frankford). See generally Sharona Hoffman, A Proposal for Federal
Legislation to Address Health Insurance Coverage for Experimental and Investiga-
tional Treatments, 78 OR. L. REv. 203 (1999) (gathering policy definitions); Frank P.
James, The Experimental Treatment Exclusion Clause: A Tool for Silent Rationing of
Health Care?, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 359 (1991) (discussing the standards at issue in a
number of HDC-ABMT cases).
121 Sage, supra note 2, at 629. See also ETHICAL FORCE PROGRAM, AM. MED.
ASS'N, ENSURING FAIRNESS IN HEALTH CARE COVERAGE DECISIONS (2004), available
at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/369/finalbenefitsreport.pdf (last
visited Apr. 14, 2005) [hereinafter ETHICAL FORCE PROGRAM].
[Vol. 15:285
DEALING WITH DYING
professional opinion that a specific therapy is not advisable. Doctors,
in doing so, "also maintain hope, offer explanations and alternatives,
and assure patients that they will not abandon them."'' 22  Insurers
should act similarly.
When insurers make decisions regarding last-chance therapies,
they should be cognizant of the special situations in which the patients
and families seeking coverage find themselves. In addition to being in
the traditionally vulnerable, relatively uninformed state in which all
patients find themselves, they have been told that death will result
unless they undergo a last-chance therapy. They likely are operating
under a therapeutic misconception that has led them to fixate on that
therapy as a cure, rather than as the experiment it almost certainly is.
They may be about to be brought face to face with the fact that insur-
ance cannot pay for everything, and that it, in fact, will not pay for
something so experimental as the procedure they wish to undergo or
the course of drugs they wish to take. Anything short of full support
with an open pocketbook is likely to upset them, so insurers should
treat these patients with kid gloves from the very beginning.
Doing so, as Sage notes, almost certainly will require voluntary
efforts on the part of insurers, for even if policy mandates are war-
ranted, they may not be effective. Some have suggested that "policy-
makers need to develop more aggressive and comprehensive ap-
proaches for facilitating voice" among patients regarding all sorts of
concerns about health care,123 and the approach outlined hereafter is
designed to help patients achieve a voice through a dialogue with their
insurers. In the wake of the Moran decision, however, ERISA pre-
emption concerns may have limited the form of procedural mandates
states will feel free to implement in the near term.' 24  One non-
legislative way to ensure that insurers revise their procedures may be
to work toward amendment of the National Committee for Quality
Assurance (NCQA) requirements for health plan grievance proce-
dures. 125 Insurers wishing NCQA accreditation (as most do) would
then feel pressure to institute improved procedures. Another way to
122 Sage, supra note 2, at 631.
123 Mark Schlesinger et al., Voices Unheard: Barriers to Expressing Dissatis-
faction to Health Plans, 80 MILBANK Q. 709, 747 (2002) (mistakenly characterizing
external review procedures as "mediation").
124 C.f Leatrice Berman-Sandler, Independent Medical Review: Expanding
Legal Remedies to Achieve Managed-Care Accountability, 13 ANNALs HEALTH L.
233, 285 (2004) ("While the Court may be narrowing the scope of ERISA preemp-
tion, in so doing, it has created a box for state-based IMR [Internal Medical Review],
which while protecting IMR from preemption, also constrains it." ).
125 Limits to Health Care, supra note 49, at 348 (proposing a regulative strat-
egy to address fears of accountability).
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convince insurers to "reprofessionalize" 126 voluntarily is to demon-
strate to them why it will benefit them to do it, for it will indeed bene-
fit them.
A. Last-Chance Therapy Coverage Decision-Making Should Be a
Multidisciplinary, Textured Dialogue
Daniels and Sabin have identified four conditions that are neces-
sary to enhance the legitimacy of a health care coverage decision-
making process: (1) limit-setting decisions, and the grounds for mak-
ing them, must be public; (2) the grounds for decisions must be ones
that fair-minded people can agree are relevant to meeting health care
needs fairly under reasonable resource constraints; (3) limit-setting
decisions must be subject to revisions and appeal, and the process for
doing so must itself meet the first two conditions; and (4) there must
be some form of regulation to ensure that the other conditions are
met.127 In the course of discussing such considerations, they sug-
gested that an external review procedure might be of use in last-
chance therapy coverage decision-making. Nevertheless, even as they
did so, they recognized that a single type of process was not likely to
work for every limit-setting situation. Rather than a single approach,
they noted that health care coverage decision-making may be a matter
of choosing from among "best practices."'128 They identified at least
three different practices they believed were valuable. While only ex-
ternal review has caught on, at least in a widespread fashion, with
policymakers and insurers thus far, the other two incorporated more
thoroughly concepts of shared decisionmaking129 of the type explored
below.
Specifically, insurers should establish a more personal, multidis-
ciplinary process, incorporating dialogue with all affected parties in
last-chance therapy dramas. Concurrently with implementing these
procedures, empirical studies should track their effect on patient satis-
faction (or lack thereof) with decisions, much as the California and
Kaiser studies have done regarding current external review proce-
dures. The results of such research would assist in further developing
legitimate, shared decision-making procedures in this most critical
area.
126 Sage, supra note 2, at 651.
127 SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 1 1-12; Limits to Health Care, supra note
49, at 323.
128 Last Chance Therapies, supra note 31, at 38.
129 See id. at 35-36.
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1. Begin at the Beginning
Rather than treating requests for coverage of last-chance therapies
like any other requests for coverage, insurers should flag them as they
come into the office and begin treating them specially at that moment.
One key is to provide full information, from the very beginning,
about what the insurer will be doing with the claim, what substantive
contract provisions apply, and what procedures are available for inter-
nal levels of appeal and for external review. Research from California
reveals that sometimes patients do not know of the availability of ex-
ternal review,1 30 and thus are unclear about what rights they may have.
As a Kaiser study points out, in states in which claimants are not ad-
vised of a right to external review until internal appeals are completed,
people who chose not to go through internal appeals did not know
there was an option to ask an independent expert about what the in-
surer did.' 31 Had they known that that option existed down the line,
they might have gone through the internal process. One way to keep
people from feeling disappointed later is to assure up front that they
know of procedural options.
Another key is to provide, even at that early stage, some extra
hand-holding, perhaps in the nature of personal contact with an identi-
fied person whose job is to ask the person seeking coverage if all in-
formation was understood and to assure that person that the insurer is
standing by him or her. After Hurricane Andrew in South Florida,
amid the sad and discouraging negative events such as looting and
dishonest contracting, there were bright spots such as the insurers who
sent agents to the scene with checkbooks to help immediately. Those
agents, appearing on the scene of the 1992 hurricane that caused
nearly $25 billion in damages, devastated mile after mile of South
Florida and directly caused 26 deaths,132 brought a level of personal
contact and caring to the scene. Clearly, a health insurer will not send
a person with a checkbook to visit every patient with a last-chance
therapy coverage request. The difference, of course, is that after a
hurricane there is no doubt the insurer must pay (although the amount
to be paid may be a subject of dispute), whereas there is substantial
doubt whether an insurer must pay for a last-chance therapy. But a
personal touch helps assure the insured that he or she is not alone.
People going through trauma, like hurricane survivors and patients
130 PHASE I REVIEW, supra note 89, at 10.
131 See generally POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 77, at 10.
132 Ed Rappoport, Nat'l Hurricane Ctr., Preliminary Report; Hurricane An-
drew 16-28 August, 1992, at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1992andrew.html (last modi-
fied Dec. 25, 1998).
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seeking coverage of last-chance therapies, feel isolated already; they
do not need impersonal bureaucracy compounding those feelings.
Hearing a personal voice, even just to offer to help decipher the pa-
perwork, can help avoid that.
2. Use a Multidisciplinary Team
Perhaps related to the latter point, there is almost undoubtedly
some value in bringing a multidisciplinary team in on every case of
requested coverage of last-chance therapies. Hall, speaking of physi-
cians dealing with patients, describes the ill as being in a state of
"'wounded humanity.' ' 133 Just as physicians exert a great deal of
power when dealing with their vulnerable patients in the context of
medical care decisions, so do insurers exert a great deal of power
when dealing with vulnerable patients in the context of coverage deci-
sions, especially when a decision will determine whether a patient will
receive a course of care she perceives as being the only one that can
save her life. The task of properly dealing with those patients can
involve many disciplines, and there is no reason why insurers should
refrain from including those many disciplines in the process of dealing
with the patient.
For example, if coverage is likely to be denied professionals from
a range of disciplines can help convey the reasoning behind the likely
impending denial of coverage. An insurer may wish to involve a
medical expert to discuss the proposed treatment with the patient. The
patient's own doctor, in fact, can and likely should be involved. So-
cial workers, nurses, mental health professionals, or grief counselors
all may be appropriate persons to involve in the process, depending on
the state of the patients and their families. Accountants or claims ad-
justers should not be involved, because their presence can highlight
the tragic choices tradeoff that is part of what is shocking the patient.
The goal of such a multidisciplinary team would be to encourage
patients to recognize (and to assist them in recognizing) the tradeoffs
inherent in the proposed last-chance therapy, to discuss the therapeutic
misconception, and to assure the patient that he or she will not be
abandoned even if coverage is denied. It may be helpful, for instance,
if an appropriately trained person were to discuss with a patient the
concept of "number needed to treat" (NNT). The NNT is the number
of patients that must be treated with the procedure or drug in question
to prevent one additional bad outcome. If a treatment that the patient
believes is a possible cure has an NNT of twenty, then that would




mean that twenty patients would have to receive the treatment before
one is cured by it.' 34 Another point to be explained might be toxicity
of the treatment. Many experimental treatments are highly toxic,
causing as much, if not more, agony as the patient's original malady,
perhaps to no good effect at all.135 Team members such as chaplains,
social workers and mental health professionals might encourage pa-
tients to think about the quality of life that they would have during the
treatment, especially in light of the odds of the treatment helping them
(or not). Hospice care and appropriate palliative measures leading
toward a good death may in fact lead to a much more pleasant remain-
ing life, of equal length. Talking in such terms can help the patient
recognize the "misconception" part of the therapeutic misconception
without presenting the news in cold, hard type in a form denial letter.
The point is that insurers must recognize that physicians, out of
belief in the therapeutic misconception themselves or in a zealous
attempt to offer hope to their patients, very well might be painting
some patients a rosier picture about potential last-chance therapies
than reality. An insurer certainly should not suggest that the physician
refrain from offering a therapy he or she thinks is a reasonable alterna-
tive,136 although it may be appropriate for some physicians to re-think
their practices in this area just a bit. Rather than gagging physicians,
insurers should join them in the effort to assure that patients do not
feel abandoned by the health care system.137 Both the physician in the
provision of care and the insurer in the coverage of care can offer
hope, even if a particular last-chance therapy will not be covered.
As noted throughout the earlier discussions about dying patients,
hope is important. Insurers denying coverage should not slap patients
in the face with the news that there is no hope. Instead, they should
work with patients and their families to realize where the real hope
lies. Maybe it is in the suggested last-chance therapy, if the evidence
shows enough of a chance that the insurer wishes to cover it, and if
the patient still wishes to undertake it after hearing more about its
134 GOODMAN, supra note 27, at 61 & n.18.
135 See supra text accompanying note 59.
136 See generally Timothy S. Hall, Bargaining With Hippocrates: Managed
Care and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 54 S.C. L. REV. 689, 696 & n.47 (2003)
(discussing gag clauses and laws passed to prohibit them).
37 See generally NAT'L TASK FORCE ON END-OF-LIFE CARE IN MANAGED
CARE, MEETING THE CHALLENGE: TWELVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING END-
OF-LIFE CARE IN MANAGED CARE 12, 44 (1999), available at http://caepp.edc.org
(recommending, among other steps, use of a "mixed management" approach to care
of the terminally ill and assignment of "a skilled, trained community volunteer or




risks and benefits. But maybe hope lies in other avenues. Sherwin
Nuland writes that physicians too often believe, mistakenly, that offer-
ing hope consists only of offering cure or remission. 138 If a physician
has done this, and offered too much hope (or, perhaps more accu-
rately, hope of the wrong kind), the insurer should not compound the
problem by acting in impersonal, rote fashion as coverage is refused.
Instead, a multidisciplinary team can offer what would be paid for, in
a therapeutic manner. Assurances of payment for non-experimental
treatments, adequate pain management, or hospice may help to offer
hope of a different kind: a redefined hope. 3 9 Perhaps as important as
anything else is assurance that the patient will not die alone. 140
3. Engage in a Dialogue
In sum, the goal for insurers should be to engage in a deliberative
dialogue regarding the proposed last-chance therapy. Just as an Ore-
gon Blue Cross/Blue Shield transplant coordinator, described by
Daniels and Sabin as "one-third nurse clinician, one-third nurse man-
ager, and one-third ethics professor," engaged in discussions with
patients while explaining why coverage might or would be denied, 14'
so too could a multidisciplinary team discuss matters with a patient
seeking a last-chance therapy. If coverage will be denied, the denial
should be conveyed through more than a flat-out "no," with no rea-
soning beyond a clinical explanation of why the treatment was con-
sidered investigational or experimental. Reason-giving is crucial for
legitimacy purposes, and it should involve more than the issuance of a
form letter with some documentation attached. Moreover, the Cali-
fomia studies have noted that it sometimes is not clear in the external
review process whether information always reaches its destination,
and they stress the importance of patients being assured that the in-
formation they have provided relevant to their conditions has reached
138 NULAND, supra note 15, at 223.
139 See id. at 233 (suggesting patients and their families need to find hope not
in elusive therapies but in realistic ways, thus redefining hope). See also id. at 246
(expressing the belief that commonly effective therapies are the most reasonable care
in which eople can place hope).
.4 Think of the slogan "Like a good neighbor, State Farm is there." State
Farm will be there, even though it may not always pay. Health insurers should offer
as much (to be there, even if not with freely opened checkbooks).
141 Last Chance Therapies, supra note 31, at 35; Limits to Health Care, supra
note 49, at 345; SETrlNG LIMITs, supra note 1, at 76-77. See also Last Chance Thera-
pies, supra note 31, at 35-36 (discussing special process adopted by a Minnesota
health maintenance organization to establish a special category of "promising treat-
ments" to be covered even though investigational).
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appropriate decisionmakers.142 Engaging in a dialogue rather than a
bureaucratic series of notices, missed calls, and frustration, is the most
straightforward way to do this.
The suggestion is that insurers deal with patients as individuals,
not as covered lives or enrollees. Insurers certainly do not have phy-
sician-patient relationships with their insureds, but to the extent they
are administrators of health plans they are indeed fiduciaries under the
law with respect to those insureds.143 Just as a physician facing a fu-
tility situation confronts a conflict between her duties of fidelity and
stewardship of resources, insurers making decisions about last-chance
therapies face like conflicts. Even if their fiduciary status does not
carry with it a duty to give precedence to individual patients over
populations of covered lives, viewing those patients as individuals
will better address the patients' anxiety, panic, and fear of abandon-
ment. In many clinical settings, when physicians face issues of allo-
cation, "patients understand the need for priority setting if the case is
made simply and honestly,"' 44 perhaps in part because the clinicians
and patients have individualized relationships. There may be more of
a chance that patients will understand insurers if they are approached
as individuals and invited into a dialogue during the process.
This can, for example, be a good way to diffuse the anger a pa-
tient might direct toward the insurer. When patients are dying, anger
is often "displaced in all directions and projected onto the environ-
ment at times almost at random.', 45 The projection would hardly be
random in the case of an insurer denying payment; one can certainly
understand why a patient would direct anger toward that insurer. But
even when entirely random,
[a] patient who is respected and understood, who is given at-
tention and a little time, will soon lower his voice and re-
duce his angry demands. He will know that he is a valuable
human being, cared for, allowed to function at the highest
possible level as long as he can.1
46
142 PHASE I REVIEW, supra note 89, at 22. Such factors are important whether
relating to the internal review or the external review process. See Nguyen v. Health-
guard of Lancaster, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 296, 300-01 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (involving
denial of coverage based on medical necessity where crucial patient information
repeatedly was not forwarded in both internal and external review context).
143 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 222-23 (2000).
144 James E. Sabin, Fairness as a Problem of Love and the Heart: A Clini-
cian 's Perspective on Priority Setting, 317 BRIT. MED. J. 1002, 1002 (1998).
145 KUBLER-ROSS, supra note 7, at 44.
146 Id. at 46.
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Bioethics offers an example of a field in which disagreements
such as this often arise because patients, or more commonly patients'
families or surrogate decision makers, are angry and intensely emo-
tional about proposed medical courses of action. Medical institutions
have developed a method of encouraging dialogue among all the in-
terested parties in cases of bioethical conflict. Within medical institu-
tions, ethics committees bring together all the parties with stakes in an
ongoing conflict to try to encourage a sharing of views, information,
and opinions. A physician approaching a case in which it appears as
if further treatment is futile, for example, may know that certain angry
family members wish that treatment be continued indefinitely. It may
even be that other members of the care team disagree with the futility
assessment. One of the physician's options at that point would be to
call for an ethics consult, so that the members of the standing ethics
committee, along with the members of the care team, can discuss the
matter and then can engage in a dialogue with the family members
(and the patient if the patient has decision-making capacity) regarding
the physician's decision that a treatment is futile.
The process can resemble mediation, and in fact, trained media-
tion specialists have begun working explicitly on the use of mediation
techniques when working through bioethical conflicts. Mediation
fosters dialogue, and mediation techniques have proven to be valuable
with regard to many bioethical disputes. 147 Like last-chance therapy
coverage disputes, many bioethical conflicts involve life-or-death
matters, an imbalance of power and knowledge among those involved,
a high level of uncertainty about the most appropriate care, and ur-
gency. 148 Mediators can frame the discussion, allow patients and fam-
ily members to have their say, permit members of the care team to
completely air their points of agreement and disagreement, and direct
the conversation toward possible appropriate outcomes. In one case,
for example, mediation assisted a family, some of whom were very
angry, in understanding that their terminally ill brother would not re-
ceive scarce platelets and in fact should have a Do Not Resuscitate
(DNR) order put on his chart. 149 The resource allocations inherent in
that case closely resemble the types of tragic choices presented by
futility cases and last-chance therapy cases. The use of mediation
147 See NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER & CAROL B. LIEBMAN, BioETHics
MEDIATION: A GUIDE TO SHAPING SHARED SOLUTIONS 14 (2004).
148 Cf Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Mediating Disputes in Managed Care: Re-
solving Conflicts Over Covered Services, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 479, 480
(2002) (listing a similar set of characteristics shared by bioethics disputes and more
general managed care coverage conflicts).
149 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 147, at 15-19.
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techniques in such settings is intended to ensure that the "concerns
and needs of family members [and the patient are] identified, ac-
knowledged, respected, and [to the extent possible] accommo-
dated. 1 50 Conversation permits those concerned to begin to come to
terms with their impending loss by expressing some of their frustra-
tions and anger and by having someone listen and respond.
The idea is to foster conversation and reason-giving so that pa-
tients do not feel abandoned. Although Daniels and Sabin spoke of
the need to have some level of publicity associated with reason-
giving, 151 there is no reason to assume that the publicity condition
requires hearings resulting in written opinions or case law. Indeed,
external review does not involve such proceedings as most external
reviews are conducted on paper only, with no hearings or in-person
contact.152 Rather than engaging in paper reviews, with decisions
communicated via letter, decisions could be reached and communi-
cated through a dialogue, encouraging give-and-take in a personal
setting, with some later commemoration of the salient facts of the
patient and the proposed treatment, stripped of identifying characteris-
tics, sent to the insurer's central headquarters to provide a database of
guidelines to consult in future cases.
B. How This More Therapeutic Process Will Help
Insurers may hesitate to engage in this rather complex, unwieldy
process for what could be hundreds or even thousands of patients at
any one time, especially when they are not likely to be required to do
so by law. They should not hesitate, however, because this is a golden
opportunity to buttress their legitimacy, to build continuing relation-
ships with insureds, and to create a record of fair process.
Legitimacy of process matters. Procedural justice research shows
that. So too does consideration of how external review in California
has helped some patients denied coverage on medical necessity
grounds accept those denials. The "special nature of health care" im-
poses upon all its organizational participants "justifiable social expec-
tations of moral behavior beyond those attributed to organizations that
make widgets or purvey potables.', 53 In the last-chance therapy con-
text especially, insurers should worry about legitimacy.1 54 There, of
15o Id. at 19.
' Limits to Health Care, supra note 49, at 325.
152 LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 19.
153 Susan Dorr Goold, Money and Trust: Relationships between Patients,
Physicians, and Health Plans, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 687, 689 (1998). See
also ETHICAL FORCE PROGRAM, supra note 121, at 33.
154 If for no other reason, insurers should be worried because of the "halo
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all places, limit-setting is necessary, so insurers should begin giving
reasons for denials in a more understandable and accessible way. As
Daniels and Sabin have stated, "because health care limit setting in-
evitably raises moral controversies, for a decision-making process to
be and be seen as fair, it must foster thorough deliberation about the
facts, reasons, and principles that are relevant to the dispute."'
' 55
Even if last-chance therapy coverage is approved, the special at-
tention paid to the patient seeking it will have been valuable. In-
creased personal attention and dialogue can help ensure that all infor-
mation reaches its intended destinations in a timely manner, which
itself can help cut down on the time and aggravation costs of decision-
making. To the extent that such assurances help avoid unnecessary
grievances and appeals, they are valuable. In addition, incorporation
of mediation techniques can take less time and money, and promote
more positive continuing relationships than other methods of coverage
decisionmaking 5 6 Such a process will also encourage, over time, the
development of a set of guidelines to be used in addressing similar
cases, 157 perhaps with an eye toward contractual revisions as technol-
ogy progresses or as clarification is required. Regardless of whether
coverage is approved or denied, the positive effects on the pa-
tient/insurer relationship (which, after all, is a continuing one) could
help patients through a difficult time.
In cases of denial, there will always arise situations in which pa-
tients will continue to be dissatisfied. For example, when similarly
situated patients are treated differently by different insurers, as they
inevitably will be, someone will always cry foul.158 Even with alterna-
tive dispute resolution, conflict still arises, "and the life and death
stakes for some patients will ensure that they will use every avenue to
effects" that could emanate toward the physicians associated with them, affecting
relationships between patients and physicians. If patients distrust insurers, there may
be derivative lack of trust that spreads to the physicians who associate with the dis-
trusted insurers. Allen Buchanan, Trust in Managed Care Organizations, 10
KENNEDY INST. ETHIcs J. 189, 191 (2000). Should that occur, the physician-patient
relationship could be damaged. Hall, supra note 2, at 475 (discussing the "halo ef-
fect" of patients' trust in an institution being influenced by their trust in individual
physicians at that institution). See also David Mechanic & Sharon Meyer, Concepts
of Trust Among Patients With Serious Illness, 51 SOC. SCt. & MED. 657, 658 (2000).
155 SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 4.
156 Dubler, supra note 148, at 500.
157 Id. at 498. See also MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 38, at § 3.25[A][d]
(making the same point about ethics committee consultations).
158 Last Chance Therapies, supra note 31, at 29 (describing the media's focus
on some coverage denials for "investigational" treatments); Holder, supra note 5, at




obtain coverage, including the courts. 1 59 In some instances, even
patients who have been treated in the most direct way possible, by
physicians and insurers who believe further treatment would be more
detrimental than helpful, will refuse to accept anything less than all-
out war on their disease,' 60 and likely will fight to get coverage of
even the most experimental of last-chance therapies.
If and when that happens, having engaged in a good process be-
forehand will assist an insurer. Based on their empirical studies,
Anderson and Hall have noted that insurers' procedures can affect the
way that health insurance coverage disputes are decided in court. 61
In bioethics disputes as well, the involvement of ethics committees in
processes leading up to the courtroom dispute has resulted in courts
looking more favorably upon the actions of health care institutions
and providers. 62 The lesson seems to be that, while good process
before a dispute reaches a court will not insulate a decision maker
from being overturned in court, it certainly cannot hurt, and it may
even help the court look favorably upon that decision maker.
Finally, insurers certainly cannot avoid the big-picture public rela-
tions and business implications of last-chance therapy decision-
making. This is a hot political potato, as demonstrated by all the state
statutes requiring clinical trials coverage and external review proce-
dures. Negative media attention of the sort accompanying the Nelene
Fox case 63 can do severe harm to a company's public image.' 64 This
is an era of consumer-driven health care, when consumer satisfaction
measures are publicized on the Internet and when employers consider
satisfaction as an indication of quality when deciding what health
plans and what health plan administrators to offer their employees.
159 Anderson & Hall, supra note 46, at 94.
160 E.g., TIMOTHY E. QUILL, A MIDWIFE THROUGH THE DYING PROCESS:
STORIES OF HEALING AND HARD CHOICES AT THE END OF LIFE 10-13 (1996) (recount-
ing the story of Cynthia, who, even with the advice of a physician who was unafraid
to confront the possibility of death with his patients, had to try a course of experimen-
tal treatment before deciding to forego treatment and accept palliative care and hos-
pice).
161 Anderson & Hall, supra note 46, at 91.
162 Limits to Health Care, supra note 49, at 347 (asserting that courtrooms are
disadvantageous places to introduce technical assessments of evidence); MEISEL &
CERMINARA, supra note 38, at § 3.25[A][d].
163 See infra note 54; see also Stone, supra note 113, at 30-31 (describing
process triggered by such publicity).
164 Cf SETTING LIMITS, supra note 1, at 49 ("Fear of litigation and exposure in
the media are the most commonly expressed objections to [the] proposal that organi-
zations be more explicit and accountable about the reasons underlying their limit-
setting decisions regarding new technologies.").
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Serving patients well, even if saying "no" to requested last-chance
therapies, cannot but help.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, it is clear that external review has not cured the
health care dispute resolution system with regard to patients' requests
for coverage of last-chance therapies, even if it has done some good in
the area of medical necessity determinations. Insurers making deci-
sions regarding coverage of proposed last-chance therapies must take
into consideration the mental states in which patients seeking last-
chance therapies are operating. They must recognize that denials of
coverage in this setting force patients to face a classic example of a
tragic choice in health care. Such denials also require patients to ac-
knowledge the fact that no treatment is available to definitively help
them live.
Against this backdrop, a bureaucratic, paper-based decision-
making process will do little or nothing to help patients accept the
sometimes-inevitable coverage denials, and in fact may increase the
chances that patients will react negatively to coverage denials. In-
stead, as in certain bioethical settings, it will prove more useful in this
coverage setting to incorporate multidisciplinary teams to work
through a dialogue about the myriad social, emotional, and medical
issues raised by requests for coverage of last-chance therapies. In this
sense, communication about the decision-making process and about
the decision itself will be handled in a conflict-management, rather
than a dispute-resolution, style, and patients will be treated as indi-
viduals rather than as covered lives.
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